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Section 118 and the Tax Treatment of
Nonshareholder Contributions to Capital
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK*
Not unlike Caeser's Gaul, all receipts of a corporation can be
divided into three parts: gross income, capital contributions, and gifts.
This article discusses the second type of receipts: capital contribu-
tions, or perhaps more accurately, corporate receipts that courts have
classified as capital contributions. For more than fifty years capital
contributions to a corporation by nonshareholders have been nontax-
able to the recipient corporation. In the last few years shopping cen-
ter developers have seized this device as a means of enhancing the
attractiveness of their developments by making tax free contributions
to the capital of their tenants. This novel use of an old doctrine
has disturbing connotations that warrant reexamination of the nontax-
ability of nonshareholder capital contributions.
I. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Gross income of corporations has always been taxable to the ex-
tent that it is not off-set by corresponding deductions.1 Gifts, on the
other hand, have always been excluded from taxable income. 2 Share-
holder capital contributions to corporations have also always escaped
taxation.3 Congress has never seen fit to tax corporations upon re-
ceipt of cash or property in exchange for stock in the corporation,
whether upon initial organization or upon post-organization increases
in corporate capital. Nonshareholder contributions to the corporation,
however, have travelled a more twisted road.
A. Cuba Railroad and its Progeny
Originally, the government's position was that, except on the rare
occasion of a gift, all cash payments to a corporation by nonshare-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. The sixteenth amendment, which was adopted in 1913, gave Congress the power to
"lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived." The first internal revenue
law enacted after that amendment made the gross income of a corporation taxable. Act of
October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 172. This practice was continued in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 13, 53 Stat. 7 and presently such treatment is accorded corporations
in I.R.C. § 11.
2. After the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, the 63rd Congress, through the Act of
October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167 (1913), excluded gifts as items of taxable income.
This practice was continued in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1. § 22(bX3), 53 Stat. 10,
and now by I.R.C. § 102.
3. I.R.C. § 118. Prior to the enactment in 1954 of § 118, common-law doctrines held that
contributions to the capital of a corporation were not income to the recipient corporation.
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holders were gross income to the corporation and thus properly in-
cludable in the corporation's taxable income.4 In 1925 the Supreme
Court in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad5 rejected the government's con-
tention that a capital contribution by a nonshareholder was taxable,
thus holding in effect that nonshareholders, as well as shareholders,
could make nontaxable contributions to a corporation.6
Cuba Railroad arose from the Cuban government's subsidization
of private railroad construction in Cuba. To induce construction of the
railroad the Cuban government agreed to reimburse Cuba Railroad
in the form of both cash and property costs of construction. The
Supreme Court held that the cash payments, reimbursement by the
Cuban government for the capital costs of construction, were non-
taxable additions to the Cuba Railroad's capital, concluding that the
contributions were not income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. 7  Although the broad definition of income later ad-
vanced by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co.8 would apparently allow nonshareholder capital contributions to
be constitutionally classified as income under the sixteenth amend-
ment, the influence of Cuba Railroad continues undiminished because
the Court delineated the criteria that distinguish capital contributions
from either income or gifts. In spite of being fifty years old, these
criteria remain significant because they were the basic tests for identify-
ing capital contributions throughout scores of cases and were finally
codified in section 118 of the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the
Supreme Court did not attempt another inclusive test for distinguish-
ing between capital contributions and income until 1973. 9
The Court in Cuba Railroad relied on three criteria in determining
whether the transfers were capital contributions. First, the Court
noted that the Commissioner had not asserted taxability to the cor-
poration of physical properties that the Cuban government had trans-
ferred to the corporation. The Court asserted without explanation
that the Commissioner was correct in not taxing the transfer of the
physical properties, saying only that the properties were "clearly"
not taxable income. 0 Second, the Court found the paments directly
proportional to the number of rail miles completed and on that basis
concluded that the payments represented reimbursement for the capi-
tal cost of the rail lines regardless whether the payments were made
prior to or after the construction of the rail lines.' Third, the Court
4. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
5. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
6. Id. at 632-33.
7. Id. at 633.
8. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
9. United States v. Chicago, B & Q.R.R., 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
10. 268 U.S. at 632.
11. Id.
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held the payments by the Cuban government were not gifts to the
railroad. The Court pointed out that governmental subsidies to rail-
roads had long been popular in the United States on the theory that
the benefits accruing to the government or its citizenry justified the
expense. Hence, because there was benefit to the contributor the dona-
tive intent necessary for a gift was lacking.1 2 Finally, the Court held
the subsidy payments were not made for services rendered or to be
rendered to the Cuban government. Although the Cuban govern-
ment received specific benefits from its contribution in the form of rate
concessions, the Court thought the importance of these specific bene-
fits did not outweigh the benefits that were expected to accrue to
the general welfare of the Cuban population as well as the govern-
ment of Cuba. Consequently, these contributions could not be con-
sidered payments for services.13
In short, the Court reasoned that: 1) whether the form of the
subsidy is cash or physical goods is irrelevant, provided that: 2) the
amount of the subsidy is directly proportional and traceable to capital
items; and 3) the payment is not for services rendered or to be ren-
dered; that is, the benefits to the contributor must be indirect or for
a third party.
Although the Court's reasoning has been applied in one form or
another for over fifty years, an important extension occurred only
one year after Cuba Railroad. In Liberty Light & Power Co.14 the
Board of Tax Appeals held, under the principles of Cuba Railroad, that
subsidies from a private party-as opposed to a governmental party-to
a corporation were nontaxable contributions to capital. The Liberty
Light & Power Company required rural consumers to pay for power line
extensions as a precondition to supplying the customers with electricity.
The board held the value of the completed lines, which were turned
over to the power company, did not constitute income' 5 but did not
discuss the difference between a government, such as Cuba, and private,
individual consumers in analyzing whether the payments actually
represented payments for service. The board virtually ignored the
third part of the Cuba Railroad test by failing to analyze whether the
payments were made in consideration for service. The fact that the
donated electric lines were clearly capital items in the hands of the
power company seemed determinative to the board. 6
After Liberty Light, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue re-
peatedly lost his attempts to tax contributions of cash or physical
property by governmental units or consumers to railways, electrical
12. Id.
13. Id. at 632-33.
14. 4 B.T.A. 155 (1926), acq. VI-I C.B. 4 (1927).
15. Id. at 164.
16. Id.
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companies, and water companies. 7 Courts repeatedly applied the
basic Cuba Railroad principle that items segregated for use as capital
or payments made in direct proportion to capital expenditures by the
corporation were to be treated as nontaxable capital contributions.
Examination of those cases, however, reveals a general failure
by the courts to give sufficient weight to the third part of the Cuba Rail-
road test: whether the contribution was essentially payment for past or
future services. Instead, the courts concentrated on the application
of proceeds from the transfer. If the proceeds were traceable direct-
ly to capital contributions or were in the form of capital items such as
electric lines or water lines, the courts would look no further. In
short, the courts used what might be called an "application" test,
which reduced the original three-part test of Cuba Railroad to a single
litmus paper test of the application of proceeds.
18
B. The Supreme Court Takes a New Look:
Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe
In 1943 the Supreme Court made a complete turnabout from
the pattern followed by the lower courts. In the case of Detroit Edi-
son Co. v. Commissioner,9 the Court ignored the first two tests of
Cuba Railroad and looked solely to the third test: whether there had
been payment for services rendered. The case contained facts not un-
like the facts in Liberty Light Co. In both cases a power company
required customers to pay for the necessary construction of electric
lines to their homes, and the lines were then turned over to the power
company. The Supreme Court held that customer payments to the
power company for the cost of line construction to their homes were
nothing more than part of the price of the service.20 The issue before
the Court was not whether the payments were income, but what was
the basis of the power lines in the company's hands for depreciation
purposes. Because the taxpayer utility had not reported the customer
payments as income-presumably because of the decision in Cuba Rail-
road-the Court held the assets had a zero basis.2' The Supreme Court
recognized and eliminated the opportunity for a double tax benefit
realized through: first, the receipt of nontaxable income; and, second,
the depreciation of the cost of power lines purchased with that income.
17. Fairfax County Water Author. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1963);
Baltimore & O.R.R., 30 B.T.A. 194 (1934), acq. XIII-2 C.B. 2 (19341; Wisconsin Hydro-Elce Co.,
10 B.T.A. 933 (1928), acq. VII- C.B. 34 (1928); Great N. Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927), petition to
review dismissed, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930). Contra, Rev. Rul. 75-557, 1975-2 C.B. 33.
clarified by, Rev. RuL 76-61, 1976-1 C.B. 12.
18. For a view supporting the use of the so-called "application" test, see Note, Tax
Consequences of Non-Shareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 66 YALr L.J. 1085 (1957).
19. 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
20. Id. at 103.
21. Id. at 102-03.
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After Detroit Edison the "application" test appeared doomed.
The Supreme Court needed only to admit its earlier mistake and
thereby limit if not overturn Cuba Railroad. Only seven years after
Detroit Edison, however, the Court made what appeared to be a com-
plete about face in Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner.2  Brown Shoe
involved community groups from several towns that had made cash
and property payments to a corporation to induce the corporation to
locate a new or expanded plant in their localities or to maintain a
minimum payroll. The Court held the payments and transfers were
contributions to the corporation's capital rather than income to the
corporation and distinguished Detroit Edison on the basis that the
citizens groups making the contributions in Brown Shoe were not the
corporation's customers as had been the case in Detroit Edison.2 3
The Court did not revert to the earlier application test, but instead
relied on a new test that examined the motivation of the transferor.
2 4
The Court felt that Detroit Edison was correct to the extent it
considered purchase of services or goods as determinative. The
Court distinguished the facts in Brown Shoe, however, on the basis
that the benefits to the community groups were not direct25 but were
only the expectations of advantages to the community at large. Hence,
there was no payment for services as in Detroit Edison. It is interest-
ing to note that, without expressly citing Cuba Railroad the Court in
Brown Shoe relied upon the same distinction the Court had relied upon
in Cuba Railroad: the distinction between payment for a direct benefit
limited to the transferor or a payment for the greater good of the com-
munity at large and only indirectly for the benefit of the transferor.
C. Congressional Response
After Brown Shoe, Congress attempted to clear up the confusion
in the cases by enacting sections 118 and 362(c) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 195e 26 Section 118 provided that capital contributions
to corporations from any source, including contributions by nonshare-
holders, were not includable in gross income. Section 362(c) insured
that no double benefit would accrue to a recipient corporation by pro-
viding that contributed property, or property purchased with contrib-
uted cash, was to have a zero basis, thereby foreclosing future depre-
ciation deductions. Although these sections were an attempt to codify
the existing law, they did not answer the question of how a nontaxable
22. 339 U.S. 583 (1950).
23. Id. at591.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 118 (original version at ch. 1. § 118, 68A Stat. 39 (1954)); I.R.C. § 362(c)
(original version at ch. 1, § 362(c), 68A Stat. 119 (1954)).
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contribution to capital was to be distinguished from a taxable payment
for services.
In 1956 the Treasury Department enacted a regulation under
section 118 to deal with the issue of the identification of capital con-
tributions," but the regulation was not successful in putting the ques-
tion to rest. Essentially, Treasury Regulation 1.118-1 relied upon the
payment for services test in identifying capital contributions by stating
that a transfer was not a capital contribution if there was "any money
or property transferred to the corporation in consideration for goods
or services rendered." The language of the regulation did little to
settle the question of what was a capital contribution because the
quoted language was little more than a reiteraticn of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Cuba Railroad, Detroit Edison, and Brown Shoe
that payments made for goods or services are income, but payments not
made for goods or services are capital contributions. The regulations
failed to explain under what conditions a transfer is payment for goods
or services. Furthermore, the regulations made no attempt to analyze
a transfer in the light of the character of the transferor.
The principles of Cuba Railroad were applied in later cases
without any particular discussion of the change in the character of the
transferor from a government to private customers. Brown Shoe in-
volved a unique sort of transferor-community groups, which lie some-
where between a private customer of the transferee whose motivation
for the transfer is solely his own well-being and a government that
presumably makes a contribution, at least in part, for the benefit of its
citizens. The regulations failed to take transferor types into considera-
tion in determining whether contributions are purchases of services or
contributions to capital. Although presumedly the cases could be de-
cided without reference to the character of the contributor, the courts
historically were concerned with the character of the contributor. Why
that concern is well founded will be discussed later.
D. The Internal Revenue Service Steps In
In 1958 the Internal Revenue Service broke the calm that had pre-
vailed after the enactment of section 118 by litigating Teleservice Co.
v. Commissioner2 8 a case dealing with contributions by would-be cus-
tomers to a cable television corporation. The Service lost in the Tax
Court, but succeeded in its appeal to the Third Circuit. In holding
that the contributions by the customers were taxable income to the
cable television company, the Third Circuit characterized the case as
indistinguishable from the earlier Detroit Edison case. The court did
not seem disturbed that the issue in Detroit Edison was the determi-
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960).
28. 254 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958).
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nation of basis rather than income. Instead, the court concluded that
because the customers received the opportunity to purchase the cable
television programming in return for their capital contributions the
payments represented payments for future service. The court dis-
tinguished Brown Shoe and the other earlier cases by pointing out that
in Teleservice there was a direct, personal relationship between the
contributor and the corporation and that, unlike Brown Shoe, the pay-
ments were not intended to benefit the community at large.29 Thus,
in Teleservice a court relied on a distinction between private customer
contributions and contributions by public or quasi-public groups for
whom contribution had no direct benefit. Surprisingly, the Internal
Revenue Service failed to vigorously assert this victory in later cases.
Although it did utilize the case in future cable television contribu-
tion cases,30 the Service also issued Revenue Ruling 58-555." In this
rather unusual ruling the Service on its own volition limited the ap-
plication of Teleservice and stated that it would not vary from its
earlier policy of classifying as capital contributions, customer payments
to regulated public utilities, which were subject to a continuing duty
to provide service to its customers to cover the costs of linking up
with the public utilities' lines. Having litigated that position many
times since the 1920's and having for the most part lost, the Service
had conceded the issue and acquiesced in those cases.3 In Revenue
Ruling 58-555 the Service inexplicably upheld its earlier acquiescence
and resolved to limit Teleservice to its facts.
Consistency not being the strongest characteristic of the Internal
Revenue Service, it was not surprising that only five years after Reve-
nue Rule 58-555 was issued there appeared another case in which
the Internal Revenue Service attempted to find taxable income in a
customer contribution to a water company. The Service lost that case,33
but finally succeeded in Hayutin v. Comnissione?4 by convincing both
the Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit that customer payments toward
the cost of water line links to a water company constituted taxable
income. The Service argued, without so much as a mention of Revenue
29. Id. at 111.
30. Community T.V. Ass'n v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 270 (D. Mont. 1962); Warren
T.V. Corp., 17 TAx CT. MEM DEC. 1053 (CCH 1958).
31. Rev. RuL 58-555, 1958-2 C.B. 25, (revoked by Rev. Rul. 75-557, 1975-2 C.B. 33).
32. Baltimore & O.1RR., 30 B.T.A. 194 (1934), acq. X111-2 C.B. 2 (1934): Southern
Ry., 27 B.T.A. 673 (1933), acq. XII-2 C.B. 13 (1933), modified, 74 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1935);
Union Pac. R.R., 26 B.T.A. 1126 (1932), acq. XII-1 C.B. 13 (1933), modified, 69 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 559 (1934); Tampa Elec. Co., 12 B.T.A. 1002 (1928). acq.
VI-2 C.B. 39 (1928); Wisconsin Hydro-Elec. Co., 10 B.T.A. 933 (1928), acq. V11-! C.B. 34
(1928); El Paso Elec. Ry., 10 B.T.A. 79 (1928), acq. Vll-2 C.B. 12 (1928); Rio Elec. Co., 9 B.T.A.
1332 (1928), acq. VII-1 C.B. 27 (1928). Great N. Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927). petition to review
dismissed, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930), acq. VII-2 C.B. 16 (1928); Liberty Light & Power Co.,
4 B.T.A. 155 (1926), acq. VI-1 C.B. 4 (1927).
33. Fairfax County Water Auth. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1963).
34. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Rule 58-555, that regardless of the history of similar cases in the 1920's
and 1930's the Supreme Court's categorization of income had suffi-
ciently broadened to require taxability of the amounts in question.,
In finding for the Service the court of appeals completely turned its
back on the old application of proceeds doctrine found in Cuba Rail-
road and looked instead at the motivation or purpose of the payment.
The court felt that Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe had established mo-
tivation of the transferor, rather than the transferee's use of the pro-
ceeds, as the determining factor.3 6  In effect, therefore, the court
followed Teleservice in finding that the motivation and circumstances
surrounding the contributions indicated the payment was for future ser-
vices-the supplying of water-so that the payments were taxable income
to the recipient corporation.37 The court was not concerned that the
contribution was directly traceable to the capital needs of the recipient
corporation. In fact, under the court's logic there could be no evidence
of capital contribution under circumstances in which the transferor
was to receive services.
The court in Hayutin had implicitly held that section 118 could
never apply to the customer-contributor situation because such con-
tributions lack an altruistic motivation. Following its success in Hau-
tin the Service pressed forward in its effort to tax customer contribu-
tions to corporations. In State Farm Road Corp. v. Commissioner8
the issue was a charge for tie-in with the taxpayer corporation's
sewage lines. In a strong opinion by Judge Tannenwald the Tax Court
upheld the Service's contention that the customer payments were
income to the recipient utility. In reviewing the history of the cases in
the area, Judge Tannenwald stated: "The climate created by judicial
history dealing with contributions to capital is, to say the least,
strange."39  Rather than attempting to reconcile the previous cases,
however, Judge Tannenwald said the only relevant test in the classifica-
tion of contributions by a nonshareholder was whether the nonshare-
holder was paying for services rendered. It was the motivation or
purpose of the transferor that controlled and not the use to which the
transferee put the money or property. Citing earlier cases, Judge
Tannenwald enunciated the established test as whether "the payments
had a 'reasonable nexus with the services which it was the business of
the recipient corporation to provide.' ,,40 Hence, the question was the
35. Id. at 479.
36. Id. at 480.
37. Id. at 480-81.
38. 65 T.C. 217 (1975).
39. Id. at 226.
40. Id. at 229 (citing Federated Dep't Stores v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 417, 421 (6th
Cir. 1970)).
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remoteness of the anticipated benefits. Judge Tannenwald relied
heavily on the reasoning found in the 1973 case of United States v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad.4 t
E. The Supreme Court Takes a Third Look: The CB&Q Case
United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad concerned
tax years prior to 1954 and thus prior to the enactment of sections 118
and 362(c). During the 1930's and 1940's Congress had attempted to
upgrade the safety of various railroad lines through grants to states
that either constructed railway improvements or reimbursed railroads
for improvements that included cross signals, signs, flood lights,
bridges, and other items. The CB&Q, one of the recipient railroads,
attempted to depreciate the improvements. The Court of Claims in a
suit for a refund held that the contributions to the CB&Q were non-
taxable contributions to capital and thus were depreciable under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because the Court of Claims decision apparently afforded a precedent
for determining the tax treatment of "substantial sums.
'4 2
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, overruled the Court
of Claims and held the contributed assets had a zero basis in the hands
of the railroad. To the majority the case hinged on whether the
transfers to the railroad were contributions to capital. Under Detroit
Edison, if the transfers were not contributions to capital, the basis of
the property in the hands of the railroad was zero. If the transfers
were contributions to capital then under section 113 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code the railroad would adopt the transferor's basis and
would thus be entitled to a depreciation allowance. Justice Blackmun
carefully reviewed the earlier Supreme Court cases in this area, Cuba
Railroad, Detroit Edison, and Brown Shoe and concluded that Brown
Shoe and Detroit Edison were not, as most commentators had
thought,43 in disagreement, but rather had merely arrived at different
answers by application of the same test. In both cases the Court had
relied on the benefit to the transferor arising from the contribution,
44
or, stated differently, the motivation of the transferor. In neither case
had the Court examined the use of the contributed property,45 and to
the CB&Q Court this constituted a failure to use the full Cuba Railroad
test. Reliance upon the benefit to the transferor without reference to
41. 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
42. Id. at 404.
43. See, e.g., Note, Taxation of Nonshareholder Contributions to Corporate Capital, 82
HARv. L. REv. 619, 625 (1969).
44. 412 U.S. at 411. Justice Blackmun is correct in noting that both Detroit Edison and
Brown Shoe relied heavily on the motivation surrounding the contributions. Nevertheless, the
outcomes of the two cases seem inconsistent.
45. Id. at411.
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the use of the contributed capital was an improper test. Justice Black-
mun found additional factors implicit in Detroit Edison and Brown
Shoe, which, if properly applied to the CB&Q facts, would result in
the proper outcome.
From those earlier cases a five part test for capital contributions
was extracted: (1) a contribution must become a permanent part of
transferee's working capital; (2) it must not be compensation for spe-
cific, quantifiable services provided; (3) it must be bargained for; (4) it
must foreseeably benefit the transferee in an amount commensurate
with the transferred asset's value; and (5) it must ordinarily be em-
ployed to generate additional income for the transferee.46 Just where
in Brown Shoe or Detroit Edison these "implicit" tests may be found
is a mystery.
When the five part test was applied to the facts of CB& Q, the
railroad lost. The assets met the first two tests because they were addi-
tions to capital and were not payment for services. The assets failed
the last three tests, however, because they were not bargained for,
provided only "marginal" benefit to the railroad, being "peripheral
to its business, and did not materially contribute to the production of
further income.' 47 In summation, Justice Blackmun wrote: "In our
view, no substantial incremental benefit in terms of the production of
income was foreseeable or taken into consideration at the time the
facilities were transferred. Accordingly, no contribution to capital was
effected. ' '48
Although the Court was careful not to overrule or even state the
need to distinguish Brown Shoe and Detroit Edison, the outcome in
the case nevertheless appears to have significantly departed from the
earlier cases. Had the Court merely applied the reasoning of Brown
Shoe and Detroit Edison the railroad would surely have been allowed
to depreciate the assets. In Detroit Edison the test was whether the
transferor had made the payment as a condition or precondition for
services to be rendered. Clearly, in CB&Q no such services were in-
volved. The federal government's position was not unlike that of the
Cuban government in Cuba Railroad, although the United States
Government in CB&Q did not even gain the benefit of lower rail rates
that the Cuban government gained in Cuba Railroad. Hence, under
the reasoning in Detroit Edison the transfer should have been classified
as a contribution to capital, and under the law that prevailed prior to
the enactment of section 362(c) the railroad should have been allowed
to adopt the transferor's basis for purposes of depreciation.
Applying the Brown Shoe holding that when the benefits from
the transfer accrue to the community at large rather than to the trans-
46. Id. at 413.
47. Id. at 414.
48. id. at 415.
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feror there is a capital contribution, it is almost impossible to dis-
tinguish the status of the federal government from that of the com-
munity groups in Brown Shoe. Under that test there also should have
been a finding of capital contribution and a corresponding approval of
the railroad's right to depreciate the carry-over basis of the trans-
ferred assets. Nevertheless, the Court thought the holding in CB&Q
-that there was no capital contribution and thus no depreciation-did
not contradict Detroit Edison and Brown Shoe.
Rather than attempting to distinguish the earlier cases, Justice
Blackmun devised the elaborate five part test that he considered im-
plicit in those cases. Even applying this test, it is not clear why the
transfer of assets from the government to the CB&Q Railroad did not
qualify as a contribution to capital. Why, for example, did Justice
Blackmun conclude that the value of the improvements to the railroad
was marginal? Although the improvements were aimed at improving
safety conditions rather than improving the profit of the railroad, the
reduction of accidents and the removal of sharp curves and obstacles
might have allowed the trains to increase the average speed and thereby
increase the efficiency and profitability of the railroad. Moreover, the
railroad might have gained significant savings from tort liability and
avoided the possibility that state law might have required the railroad
to upgrade safety facilities at its own expense at some later date. In
short, the improvements might have made possible both higher prof-
its and lower future expenses.
Perhaps a more important question is what was the basis of the
Court's assertion that the foreseeable benefit of the transferred asset
to the transferee must be commensurate with its value in order to be
a contribution to capital. The opinion cited no cases supporting the
proposition, possibly because the position was not supported by any
previous cases. This test along with the other four tests was cut out
of wholecloth prepared for the occasion. It is not implausible that
this case is a classic example of a result-oriented decision. The Court
was aware that the CB&Q Railroad would stand to gain windfall de-
preciation deductions if it were allowed the transferor's cost as its ad-
justed basis in the improvements."'
Perhaps the key indicator of the Court's failure to come to grips
with the issues of the case was its inability to understand the need to
classify the contributions. As noted, all payments to corporations are
divided into three classifications: gross income, contributions to capi-
tal, and gifts. The Court held that the transfers were not contribu-
tions to capital without indicating what the transfer represented.
Because transfers were not treated as income at the time of their re-
49. Id. at 407.
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ceipt,50 it would appear that the only available classification is that
of a gift. Certainly a gift is conceivable, but whether that is the correct
classification is another question.
Not only is the outcome of the case dubious, but it is even doubt-
ful whether the five-part test has really established any new standards.
Close examination of the tests seems to indicate very little change from
previous cases.
The Court's first test-that the item must become a permanent part
of the transferee's working capital-was established initially in Cuba
Railroad and has never seriously been challenged since."1 The require-
ment that the contribution not be compensation was found in Cuba
Railroad,52 emphasized in Brown Shoe"a and Detroit Edison 4 and
specifically enacted in the 1956 regulations under section 118. The
Court's language offers nothing more useful or helpful in classifying
payments than the regulations, which are models of vagueness.
By the third requirement-that the contribution be bargained for-
the Court is apparently looking for some way to distinguish between a
contribution and a gift; but surely there are already more than enough
tests for identifying gifts.55 The fourth test-that the transferred assets
foreseeably result in benefit to the transferee commensurate with its
value-is vague and almost impossible to apply. Benefit is a slippery
concept. As seen in CB&Q, while it is easy enough to state that no
commensurate benefit is enjoyed by the transferee, it is another matter
to prove such an assertion. Moreover, the test does not necessarily
distinguish contributions of capital from other transfers to a corpora-
tion. Payments that are gifts or income may also have a value to the
recipient corporation equal to their value in the hands of the transferor.
In any event the only relevant test of benefit is the fifth test-that the
contributed asset ordinarily produce income, or reduce expenses for
the recipient corporation.
Corporations determine the benefit or value of potential assets by
one of two tests. The first test is the sale value of the asset on the open
market. The second test is the rate of return or rate of profit the
asset can be expected to generate if retained.5 6  The first test is, of
50. Id. at 408.
51. Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 632 (1925).
52. Id. at 633.
53. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583, 591 (1950).
54. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 103 (1943).
55. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
56. An item of no value could be considered not a capital item because it would not have
to be included on the balance sheet of the corporation. An item with a lower value in the hands
of the recipient corporation than in the hands of the transferor will nonetheless be included in
the capital assets of the transferee. A regulated public utility that cannot include the con-
tributed property for ratemaking purposes, however, will not earn any rate of return from the
contribution. The contributed property is arguably not a capital a;set in the hands of the
utility.
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course, merely an intermediate step toward the second test because
the fair market value of productive assets is a function of the rate of
return that the asset can earn or the extent to which the asset can reduce
otherwise unavoidable costs. Thus, all assets are valuable to a corpora-
tion only to the extent the assets contribute to the profitability of the
corporation.57 What Justice Blackmun was saying in the fourth and
fifth part of his test is that it is possible for the transferor to contribute
assets that are of great value to the transferor even though the assets
have little or no value to the transferee corporation because the asset
either (a) cannot be sold or traded on the open market, or (b) will not
produce an adequate rate of return.58
The facts in CB&Q suggest certain implicit assumptions made by
the Court. The Court apparently felt that the government's motivation
in transferring the property to the railroad was to promote the public
benefit. This test alone would qualify the contribution as a contribu-
tion to capital under Brown Shoe. Because the Court in CB&Q felt
that motivation was equal evidence of donative intent, it required that
the transfer pass a second test: whether the items transferred had a
commensurate value to the transferee.59
If the "benefit or value to the transferee" test is applied in the
context of the earlier cases, the outcome in those cases is not affected.
In Cuba Railroad, for example, the transferred rail lines clearly had
benefit or value to the transferee. In Detroit Edison the test was never
reached because the motivation test clearly revealed a payment for
services. In Brown Shoe the motivation of the transferor was found
consistent with a contribution to capital because the transferor recog-
nized only an indirect benefit. The second test-benefit or value to the
57. The Court in CB&Q never addressed the question of when the value of transferred
items should be determined. Should the value of the transferred assets be tested after some
indeterminable time, or is it enough that the transferor reasonably expects that the transfer
will produce economic benefits to the transferee? Surely the answer must be the latter
otherwise, determining the classification of the transfer could not be done at the time of the
transfer. The parties (and the Internal Revenue Service) would be forced to wait in order to
determine if transferred assets were of any value to the transferee. And if the transferred
assets were apparently without value to the transferee, would it be arguable that a more eco-
nomically skillful transferee would have found a way to make the transferred asset valuable to
its business? The test of the value of transferred assets, therefore, must occur at the time
of the transfer. If the transferor is reasonable in assuming that the transferred property has
value to the transferee, there is no reason not to classify the transfer as a contribution to
capital, even though the possibility remains that the transferred assets may turn out to have no
value to the transferee.
58. An example of such an asset would be a piece of sculpture that is fixed in place at a
certain geographical location. Imagine that the creating artist donated the sculpture to a
corporation. Further postulate that the cost of materials in producing the sculpture was 100x
dollars. The artist deeds title in the sculpture to the corporation. The corporation cannot
use the sculpture in any way to produce a profit. Moreover, if the sculpture is not movable,
its location may be so undesirable that no one will want to buy the sculpture. Thus, the sculpture
has no value to the corporation. Under the CB&Q test, regardless of the artist's motivation in
deeding the sculpture to the corporation, the transfer could never be considered a contribu-
tion to capital because the item transferred has no economic benefit to the corporation.
59. 412 U.S. at 413.
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transferee-was easily satisfied because the transferred asset was a
manufacturing plant.
If a transferor transfers property to a transferee under the reason-
able belief that the transferred property has value to that transferee,
it follows that the transferor was motivated, at least in part, to engage
in the transaction for the benefit of the transferee. Of course, as in
the case of Brown Shoe, benefiting the transferee may be only a means
to an ultimate end, for example, benefiting either the transferor or some
third party. If the transferor is motivated to aid the transferee and acts
in a manner reasonably likely to produce a benefit for the transferee,
the transfer should be classified as a contribution to capital. In short,
just as all roads lead to Rome, so do all tests of contributions to capital
lead to an examination of the motivation of the transferor. The par-
ticular test of CB&Q is, if not particularly useful, at least not incor-
rect. Unfortunately, because CB&Q is a Supreme Court decision, it
may be considered a "landmark" decision. If that occurs the confusion
in the area will only increase because the case essentially adds nothing
new. The so-called "benefit or value to the transferee" test is only an
additional means of examining the motivation of the transferor.
F. Shopping Center Developers Discover Section 118
Up to this point all contributors have been classified as either
(1) a government, (2) a quasi-governmental or community body, or
(3) a private individual or customer. While the Internal Revenue
Service and the CB&Q Railroad were litigating the issue of deducti-
bility there developed a series of cases involving contributions by a
fourth category of contributors-shopping center developers.
To the extent the shopping center developers consist of individuals
or corporations, they are analogous to the third category. They can
be distinguished, however, by the nature of the intended benefit that
motivates the contribution. The benefit to the transferor is indirect
because private individuals or corporations make contributions with-
out any expectation that the transferee will provide future services.
In the third category such as in Teleservice or in the case of a con-
tribution by a customer to a public utility, however, the link between
contribution and future services is direct because the capital contribu-
tion is a precondition to receipt of services. In the context of a shop-
ping center development, a transferor subsidizes a transferee in order
to induce the transferee to locate in transferor's shopping center. In
a sense, such a subsidization is a combination of the Brown Shoe
situation, in which a subsidy involving choice of location is involved,
and Detroit Edison, in which the transferor was an individual or cor-
poration subsidizing another corporation or individual not for the gen-
eral good of the community but for the specific benefit that would
accrue to the transferor.60
60. Those who develop shopping centers have long known that the success or failure of a
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The Internal Revenue Service has challenged the application of
section 118 to department stores that receive a subsidy in order to
locate in a particular shopping center. In the initial case that came
before the Tax Court, Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,6 the developer granted the taxpayer-department store ten acres
of free land and agreed to pay the department store $200,000 a year for
ten years to induce the store to locate in the developer's shopping
center. The taxpayer-department store constructed a building worth
approximately $2 million and opened the department store, treating
the transfer of land and annual payments as nontaxable contributions
to capital under section 118. Taxpayer correspondingly claimed a
basis in the building equal to the construction cost minus the value of
the subsidy as provided by section 362(c). The Service argued the
cash payments were income to the taxpayer 62 and proposed that for
purposes of depreciation taxpayer be granted an increase in the ad-
justed basis equal to the taxable subsidy of the building.
The Service's main contention was that payment to taxpayer was
primarily motivated by the developer's desire to increase the value of
the shopping center. Thus, the Service reasoned, because the domi-
nant, if not sole, motivation was to benefit the transferor, the transfer
failed to qualify under section 118. The Tax Court held unanimously
(with two judges not taking part in the case) that the subsidies qualified
as contributions to capital under section 118.63 Without disputing the
contention of the Service that the dominant test was the motivation
of the transferor, the court held that when a transfer was motivated
only by the transferor's anticipation of indirect benefits, there existed
shopping center depends upon attracting a sufficient number of customers to the center. The
relationship of the stores within a shopping center is symbiotic in that many of the stores could
not individually attract sufficient patrons to warrant locating within the center. Each store is
dependent upon the drawing power of the other stores. Two principles explain this de-
pendency. The first principle is that customers-may be attracted to the center merely because
of the number of stores located there. A customer can be assured that whatever he or she
may be searching for will be sold by one or more of the stores. The second principle is the
spin-off theory, which states that customers attracted to a location because of store A may also
patronize store B merely because of the convenience it offers. On the basis of the spin-off
theory, a small specialty store that might not attract sufficient customers if located in isolation
will locate next to a larger or more prestigious store that independently draws customers. Thus,
in order to insure that the center will be successful, a developer must have a full-line depart-
ment store which is well known in the area. By its reputation this anchor store will ensure
the success of the shopping center.
As more and more shopping centers have developed it has become more difficult for
developers to attract these full-line department stores into their developments. So difficult, in
fact, that some developers are now prepared to grant subsidies to major department stores
to induce them to locate in the developer's shopping centers. The subsidies consist of either
land or a building given to the department store or reimbursement to the store for the cost of
its building. The department store receiving the subsidy reports the transaction as a contribu-
tion to capital, which qualifies for section 118 treatment, and presumably the developer de-
ducts or amortizes the cost of the subsidization.
61. 51 T.C. 500 (1968), aft'd, 426 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1970).
62. The tax treatment of the transfer of the land was not raised as an issue in the case.
63. 51 T.C. at 520.
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a contribution to capital. The court apparently felt the issue was
obvious because it did not engage in any close reasoning or argument,
but simply stated the conclusion and cited the older cases in the area,
including Cuba Railroad.
The court also relied heavily upon the historical background of
section 118 and quoted from the Senate Finance Committee Report on
the section. The court was persuaded by the Senate committee's
language which stated that a contribution to capital existed whenever
the transferor was to realize "an intangible future benefit . .. so
intangible as to not warrant treating the contribution as a payment for
future services." 64 The court did not bother to analyze how or why
the case before it fit the quoted language. Nor did the court bother
to discuss the fact that both section 118 and the committee language
arose shortly after Brown Shoe. Arguably, the language used by the
Senate committee applied to a contribution whose hoped-for benefits
were to be enjoyed not only by the contributor but also by the com-
munity in general, as in Brown Shoe. Moreover, the quoted com-
mittee language was taken from a context that distinguished contribu-
tion to capital payments from gifts. The full quotation states: "In
many such cases because the contributor expects to derive indirect
benefits, the contribution cannot be called a gift; yet the anticipated
future benefits may also be so intangible as to not warrant treating
the contribution as a payment for future services."65
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals" the Service
added a second argument to its original argument that if the transferor
was motivated by the benefits to be realized by the transferor rather
than any concern for the general welfare of the community, the transfer
should be classified as income to the recipient. The second argument
was that section 118 should be limited to transfers by a governmental
unit or a civic group. In rejecting this argument the Sixth Circuit
pointed out that Treasury Regulation 1.118-1, which provides that
capital contributions may be made by a governmental unit or civic
group, is to be read only as illustrative and not as a definitive limita-
tion on the qualifications of contributors of capital.67 Moreover, the
Senate Finance Committee language had specifically referred to any
"association of individuals having no proprietary interest in the cor-
poration"" as a source of nonstockholder contributions to capital.The government's first contention with respect to the motivation
64. Id. at 519.
65. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNo. & Am,
NEws 4025, 4042.
66. Federated Dep't Stores Inc. v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 417 (6t Cir. 1970).
67. Id. at 422.
68. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4025, 4042.
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of the transferor was again not treated as determinative in the charac-
terization of the payment. The appellate court held that the expecta-
tion of profit by the transferor was "of such a speculative nature that
any benefit necessarily must be regarded as indirect." 69 The court
found that the contributions did not have a reasonable nexus with the
services to be provided by the transferee, and, therefore, the transfer
was classified as a contribution to capital. Although the court relied
heavily upon Brown Shoe, it did not acknowledge the different nature
of the motivation that induced the subsidy in Brown Shoe as opposed
to the motivation of the shopping center developer.
An almost identical case, May Department Stores Co. v. Commis-
sioner,70 arose two years later. Once again a shopping center developer
induced the location of a prime tenant through a subsidy consisting of
free land. The Service argued that the indirect and intangible benefits
test could only be applied to a contributor who enjoyed those benefits
as a member of the community at large and not in the capacity of a
shopping center developer. In finding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court
held that such a restricted notion of who could receive indirect or in-
tangible benefits was incorrect and that so long as the benefits enjoyed
by the shopping center developer were in fact only indirect and in-
tangible the developer qualified as a possible contributor of capital.7'
The Service appealed to the Eighth Circuit, but lost in a per curiam
opinion.72
Although the Service lost on the shopping center front, it was
more successful under a slightly different factual situation. In John B.
White, Inc. v. CommissioneW3 the Service convinced the court that a
corporation operating a Ford dealership received taxable income when
the corporation received payment from Ford Motor Co. to locate in a
more desirable neighborhood. The court distinguished the earlier
Federated Department Stores case on the basis that the benefits in
Federated Department Stores were indirect or intangible while the
anticipated benefits in the present case had a reasonable nexus to the
services provided by the taxpayer corporation. The court concluded
that the dealer provided services in the form of the sale and promotion
of Ford products and that Ford paid the subsidy with the expectation
that the new location would result in greater sales and better promo-
69. 426 F.2d at 421.
70. 33 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. 1128 (CCH 1974), affd per curiam, 519 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir.
1975).
71. Id. at 1130.
72. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1975).
73. 55 T.C. 729 (1971), aft'd, 458 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1972).
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tion of Ford products. Because the court considered the subsidy
motivated by considerations that were directly beneficial to Ford, it
concluded that the subsidy could not meet the indirect benefit test
of section 118 and therefore represented income to the recipient. The
court recognized that the case was very similar to Federated Depart-
ment Stores and characterized the line between the two cases as "a
shadowy one.
7 4
II. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ERRORS IN THE
SHOPPING CENTER CASES
The holdings in Federated Department Stores and May Depart-
ment Stores appear wrong both as a matter of law and economics.
If the courts in those cases had correctly applied the tests originally
outlined in Cuba Railroad, they would not have erred. The original
Cuba Railroad test was a three-fold test. First, the form of the subsidy
was irrelevant; both cash and property could represent either income
or a tax-free contribution to capital. Second, in order to be a capital
contribution the transferred cash or property had to be traceable to
the capital accounts of the transferee. Third, the payment could not
be made for services rendered or to be rendered. 75 The facts in both
Federated Department Stores and May Department Stores appeared
to satisfy the first two parts of the test. The courts went astray,
however, when they applied the third test-payment for services
rendered. The third part of the Cuba Railroad test was created against
the backdrop of a governmental subsidy. In that context the most
significant benefits, according to the Supreme Court, accrued to the
population of Cuba and only to a lesser extent to the Cuban Govern-
ment. 76  The benefits described by the Court in that case were, to use
the language of later cases, "indirect benefits.
77
74. Id. at 737.
75. 268 U.S. 628, 632 (1925).
76. From an economic standpoint the development of a railroad as in Cuba Railroad is
tremendously important to the economic development of a country. The benefit to the Cuban
population from the development of the railroad was two-fold. First, the railroad was a means
of transportation for the population. Second, and more important, the railroad played an
important if not decisive role in the economic development of the country. A government
benefits indirectly from such benefits to its population. If the government believes its existence
is justified or predicated upon service to the population, the government is benefited by having
its obligation to aid the citizenry fulfilled by the railroad. Regardless whether the govern-
ment feels an obligation to improve the economic position of its population, the government
will nevertheless benefit if the economy of the nation is improved because an improved
economy generally aids the government's position vis a vis both its domestic and foreign
opponents and more particularly, because the improved economy may generate greater tax
revenues.
77. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 1970):
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 33 TAX CT. MEat. DEc. 1128 1130 (CCH 1974), aff'd,
519 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Unless the subsidy by the Cuban government is imputed to the
population of Cuba, one must conclude that the population in Cuba
Railroad did hot pay for the benefits that it received. Hence, party A,
the Cuban government, made payments to party B, the railroad, for
benefit of a third party C, the population of Cuba. It is, of course,
possible to classify payments for benefit of a third party as income to
the transferee. Perhaps that would have been the wisest thing to do.
Short of repealing sections 118 and 362(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code and overruling Cuba Railroad and its progeny, however, one must
accept the nontaxability of such transfers. Nevertheless, the class of
transfers denoted as nontaxable contributions to capital should be nar-
rowly construed. If not, more and more taxpayers will arrange trans-
actions to come within the protection of section 118.
78
A major feature distinguishing Cuba Railroad from many later
cases that would allow a narrow construction of the transfers is the
character of the transferor. When the transferor is a foreign or domes-
tic governmental unit, the tax classification of the transfer is irrelevant
with respect to the transferor because a government is not subject to
the United States Internal Revenue Code. Nonprofit civic associa-
tions, such as in Brown Shoe, are similarly exempt from taxation. 9
The nontaxability of the transferor in the case of governmental units
or civic associations means the cost of the transfer to the transferor
will not be written off as an income tax deduction.
If the transferor is a taxable entity it is possible-and probable,
thanks to the liberal net loss carry forward provisionsSo-that the trans-
feror will be able to deduct the subsidization cost. If transferor, for
example, contributes $100 to transferee in a manner qualifying under
section 118, transferor will have a deduction of $100, but there will not
be a corresponding increase of $100 in the income of the transferee
in the year in question.
When the transferor is a taxable entity, the classification of the
transfer -is critical with respect to federal tax revenues. If the transfer
qualifies under section 118, the potential loss to the government is the
tax on $100, which if the transferor is a corporation taxed at the 48%
rate'1 is forty eight dollars.12  Of course, if the $100 of value is a de-
78. The leading exponent of eliminating deductions from the Internal Revenue Code is
Stanley Surrey who thinks tax incentives are an undesirable way to promote public policies.
See Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax
Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REv. 352 (1970). Whether
Surrey would consider section 118 to be a tax expenditure or tax incentive is unknown.
Nevertheless, minimizing deductions is on the whole a desirable objective. But see Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. RLV. 925 (1967).
79. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
80. I.R.C. § 172.
81. I.R.C. § 11.
82. Under certain conditions when the transferors realized benefit of the subsidy has a
measurable life, the transferor may be required to amortize the subsidization deduction over a
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preciable item or is used to purchase a depreciable item, then because
of section 362(c), the tax loss to the government is one of deferral
rather than total avoidance. The transferee has in effect "lost" $100
of depreciation deductions. Because money has value over time, how-
ever, delaying collection of the tax is a net loss to the government in
real dollars. Moreover, if the item purchased for cash or transferred
is not depreciable, such as land, or has a relatively high salvage value,
and to that extent is not depreciable, the potential tax deferral is
much greater. The deferral will exist until transferee sells or ex-
changes the item in a taxable transaction at which time the lower basis
caused by section 362(c) may result in higher taxable income to the
transferee.
It is possible, however, that the tax deferral may become tax
avoidance through the operation of section 1014 at the death of a non-
corporate transferee, which results in a partial "stepped-up basis"
that will avoid the penalty of section 362(c).83  Moreover, if the delay
in the sale is long enough the discounted value of the later tax pay-
ment may be great enough to constitute de facto tax avoidance. Ad-
ditionally, inflation may so lessen the value of the dollars used to pay
a deferred tax that substantial tax avoidance in effect will occur.
It is also possible that the transferee may exchange the subsidized
property in a tax-free manner,8 4 thereby greatly extending the tax
deferral. Finally, if the transferee uses the subsidy to purchase land
or any other capital asset, gain realized from a later sale will be
taxable at capital gains rates. 85 The transferor, of course, will have
taken the cost of the deduction against ordinary income. Thus, it ap-
pears the classification of an item under section 118 gives rise not
only to tax deferral, but may also encourage tax avoidance.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONTRIBUTORS AND BENEFITS
A. Customer Contributions and Utilities
It was noted above that Cuba Railroad was quickly extended to
cases in which the transferor was an individual rather than a govern-
ment.86  When utility customers, as a precondition to receiving ser-
period of years equal to such life. The shopping center developer who "donated" a building to
Federated Department Stores, for example, probably amortized the co',t of the building over its
useful life. Query whether such amortization would still be required if the subsidy were repay-
ment to the store for the cost of erecting its own building? Arguably , such repayment would
have to be amortized over the life of the building. The effect the timring of the deduction for
transfer upon the form of the subsidy to the transferee certainly belie; the claim that the con-
nection between the subsidy and the benefit to the transferor is too "indirect" to warrant
taxing the transferee.
83. I.R.C. § 1014. The effect of this section has been diminished by the limitation on the
step-up of basis in § 1023 enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat, 1525.
84. See I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1032, 1033.
85. I.R.C. § 1201.
86. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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vice, paid a "capital assessment" for the cost of extending the utility
lines to their homes, the payments were held nontaxable contributions
to capital.8 7 In such cases loss of tax revenue to the government did
not arise from the transferor claiming a deduction, because they were
generally private individuals for whom the cost of obtaining the utility
link-up was not a deductible item. The loss of revenue to the govern-
ment arose, therefore, only to the extent the utility was able to defer
or avoid taxation. Thus, the utility cases are analogous to Cuba Rail-
road in that the transferor in both cases did not take a deduction equal
to the cost of the subsidy.
The utility cases do differ from Cuba Railroad in at least one im-
portant respect. In Cuba Railroad significant benefits accrued to
individuals who were third party beneficiaries. Moreover, the benefits
to the transferor government were at best vague and indefinite. In the
case of utility customer contributions to capital, there is no third party
beneficiary, and the benefit to the transferor is direct and specific.
Nonetheless, in both cases the benefit is not economic. The well-
being of the transferor, to be sure, is enhanced by the subsidy, but the
receipt of electrical power is not a taxable event for the customer.
In Brown Shoe there is yet another type of subsidizing body-the
civic association. Here, although the civic association-transferor that
directs the subsidy does not receive economic benefits per se, its
members most certainly hope to realize such benefits. The civic as-
sociation may, of course, realize a benefit on account of added mem-
bership both from the new concern entering the community and from
the general economic growth that may result from the addition of a
new manufacturing plant. Surely, however, the prime motivation
behind the subsidy is not to aid the civic association per se, but to
benefit its members by means of increased economic activity; how-
ever, that is not the only benefit that will be realized.
B. Benefits
In the case of a subsidy by a civic association, there are at least
three categories of possible benefits: 1) the benefits enjoyed by the
contributing civic association; 2) the benefits enjoyed by the contrib-
utors who comprise the civic association; and 3) the benefits enjoyed
by individual citizens or businesses that are not members of the civic
association or that do not contribute to the subsidization activity.
The individual citizens may benefit from a new job or higher wages.
Noncontributing businesses may also benefit from the increased eco-
nomic activity. This third benefit category is similar to a gift from
the transferor to the benefiting party. The benefits realized by the
87. Liberty Light & Power Co., 4 B.T.A. 155 (1926), acq. VI-1 C.B. 4 (1927): see Fairfax
County Water Auth. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1963): Rev. Rul. 58-555, 1958-2
C.B. 25 (revoked by Rev. RuL 75-557, 1975-2 C.B. 33).
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area citizens and the noncontributing businesses place them in the
category of gratuitous beneficiaries. The benefits to them are perhaps
predictable and expected, but are not the motivation for the contribu-
tion.
The existence of gratuitous beneficiaries demionstrates that any
locational choice by a manufacturer or any economic activity under-
taken as a result of a capital contribution has benefits that cannot
be limited to the contributor or to a desired group of beneficiaries.
These "spin-off' benefits give rise to transfers difficult to classify. It is
only a short step from a transferor making a contribution in order to
achieve the direct X benefits and disregarding the advantages of Y
spin-off benefits, to the point where the contributor makes the contri-
bution motivated not by the most obvious direct X benefits, but in
order to enjoy the Y spin-off benefits. Analysis, therefore, of the types
of economic benefits that may be realized is crucial.
One method of classifying benefits is to divide. them into the fol-
lowing three vague areas:
1) Direct benefits.
2) Intermediate benefits.
3) Indirect benefits.
Direct benefits are benefits that result from enjoyment of the product
to be produced by the transferee. In the case of a water company,
the primary benefit to be realized by the contributor is the availabil-
ity of water. Similarly, the primary benefit obtained from an electric
company is the electricity generated by the transferee. There are
other cases in which products produced by the transferee are needed
by the transferor. Thus, the transferor or his agent, for example, a
civic association, contributes to the transferee in order to induce the
production of the desired product. A construction company, for ex-
ample, might induce by means of a capital contribution the nearby
location of a cement manufacturer.88
Intermediate benefits are benefits that arise from the direct par-
ticipation by the benefiting parties in the economic activities of the
transferee. A local government might subsidize the location of a
manufacturing plant in order that its constituents benefit through
jobs in the plant. Similarly, local businessmen might contribute
through their civic association to the subsidization of an assembly
plant to be located in their vicinity. They contribute with the expecta-
tion that they will be able to sell goods and services to the assembly
plant.
Indirect benefits are all other benefits that might be realized as
a consequence of a locational decision or economic activity to be un-
dertaken by the transferee. An example might be local businessmen
88. See Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1942).
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who induce the location or expansion of manufacturing plants in the
region in the expectation that the region's general economic climate
will improve and thus increase the businessmen's sales. A local mu-
nicipality might make subsidies in order to increase the economic ac-
tivity in the area and thereby generate additional tax revenues from
sales or income taxes.
If it is possible to distinguish between three or more different
kinds of beneficiaries and three types of benefits, it is apparent that
there will be many combinations of beneficiaries and benefits. Per-
haps it is this multiplicity of combinations that accounts for the appar-
ent confusion in the treatment of the cases by the various courts.
All too often, the courts have failed to sort out the precise parameters
of the case.89 For example, if a municipal government subsidizes
the ACME Widget Plant to locate in its community, who is the bene-
ficiary and what is the form of the benefit? One can imagine at
least some of the motivations behind the subsidy or contribution.
The local government may rely heavily upon a property tax for rev-
enue and perceive a direct benefit in the form of greater tax revenues.
The government pays now with the expectation that the company will
pay later. There is also the possibility that the municipal government
intends to benefit not only itself, but its constituents as well. In fact,
the government may be acting merely as an agent for its constituents.
The benefits to the citizens probably encompass all three varieties
previously described. First, citizens who need the products to be pro-
duced by the subsidized manufacturing plant receive the direct bene-
fit of a convenient source of widgets. Some citizens will be future
employees of the ACME Widget Plant and realize intermediate bene-
fits in the form of wages. Still other citizens will indirectly benefit
from the mere increase in economic activity. For example, the local
retail stores may make more sales as a result of the payroll produced
by the ACME Widget Plant. Other citizens who are content in their
present jobs may find that the new employer in the area will cause
a general rise in wages. This example demonstrates that all three
types of benefits may be realized from a single subsidization.
The example also contains a variety of beneficiaries. First, bene-
fits will accrue directly to the contributing municipal government.
Next, benefits will accrue to the constituents of the contributor, real-
istically, composed of only a few, select individuals or classes who may
have been responsibile for the subsidization. Furthermore, benefits
will, in most instances, accrue to third party or gratuitous benefi-
ciaries. For example, towns or counties surrounding the subsidizing
community may benefit from the location of the ACME Widget Plant.
89. A tradition was established by Cuba Railroad-with the Supreme Court seemingly more
concerned with the labels attached to the activity than with the underlying economic reality.
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A motel by the highway that leads to the plant may realize increased
business. The railroad or truck companies in the area may also real-
ize increased business. In any contribution situation one can expect to
find an almost endless number of possible beneficiaries enjoying a va-
riety of benefits. It is far from clear, however, that the courts have al-
ways appreciated the complexity inherent in these cases. 90
The above example points out that every business decision that
causes an increase in business activity or that is concerned with a
locational decision produces a variety of economic benefits. These
benefits are not limited to individuals or concerns that have direct
dealings with the manufacturing concern. The indirect or "spin-off"
benefits may be even more valuable. The degree of value and those
to whom it may be valuable is not always clear. Business activity
also produces detrimental spin-offs. Again, who is injured or harmed
and to what extent is also often indeterminable. The only generali-
zation possible is that any economic activity has a variety of spin-off
effects. Moreover, the corporation or other generator of the economic
activity that creates spin-off value generally is incapable of allocat-
ing the value of such spin-offs to any particular party.
Thus, in the example above, suppose ACME Widget Plant has de-
cided to build a new plant. It is probably not feasible for ACME to
direct to any particular party the increased motel accommodation
business that may result from its locational choice. But it is possible
that an interested party could predict the existence of the spin-off
economic activity and as a consequence might try to influence
ACME's choices in order to benefit from the potential spin-off eco-
nomic activity. Thus, the motel operators of community X might urge
their community to subsidize ACME by granting it tax rebates, or
the operators might contribute themselves to the subsidization in some
small way. Realistically, all parties that contribute or urge their
agents or local governments to contribute subsidies of capital contri-
butions do so expecting one of the three forms of benefits already dis-
cussed. If no such benefits are realized either for the contributor or
some beneficiary of his choosing then the contribution should be con-
sidered a gift.
In short, contributors or their agents make investments upon
which they hope to realize an economic return. Although it is possible
to differentiate between an assured or speculative return, or among di-
rect, intermediate, and indirect benefits, such distnctions are funda-
mentally irrelevant. In all these situations the motive remains the
same: businessman A expends X dollars hoping for a return of Y per-
cent. The contributing businessman is not concerned with the type or
90. For example, note the lack of sophisticated investigation in Brown Shoe Co. v. Com-
missioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950), with respect to the nature of the benefits.
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the source of benefit expected. It is enough that there is benefit. Fol-
lowing classical capitalist economic doctrine the rate of return that he re-
quires is a function of the speculativeness or risk of his investment.9'
Thus, the more indirect or speculative the benefit, the greater the po-
tential benefit must be to warrant the assumption of risk.92 It is the
risk factor that determines the amount and conditions under which the
businessman or his agent will make the investment.
From an economic standpoint, therefore, it is senseless to dif-
ferentiate the income tax treatment of the transferee according to
an alleged varying motivation of the transferor because there is no
"varying" motivation. All transfers have at their source a single mo-
tivation-the hope for economic benefits. If one is to distinguish be-
tween taxable and nontaxable contributions one must abandon the
motivation test in favor of examining the economic circumstances that
surround the transfer.
93
IV. THE ATTEMPTS OF CONGRESS AND THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO DEAL WITH
CUSTOMER CONTRIBUTIONS
If the motivation test does not provide the means to distinguish
section 118 transfers from income to recipient transfers, must sec-
tion 118 by its nature cover transactions that it ought not cover, or
should it be read so narrowly that it excludes transfers Congress in-
tended it to cover? The regulations seem to indicate an indirectness
of benefit test to identify capital contributions. 94  As already demon-
strated, however, an economic benefit is a benefit regardless whether it
is direct or indirect. The regulation, therefore, does not aid in the
analysis.
Earlier this article divided all transferors into four classifications
and noted that in Federated Department Stores the Internal Revenue
Sdrvice argued that only governmental or civic groups were eligible
to be transferors of capital contributions. The Service did not suc-
ceed in this attempt to limit qualifying capital contributions. As a
practical matter, however, the Service has been successful in severely
limiting the nature of the section 118 transferor.
Under current case law, contributions from government or quasi-
governmental groups may qualify as capital contributions.95 Private
91. See R. MILLER, EcoNoMIcs TODAY 237 (1973).
92. The two are not necessarily correlative. It is possible that indirect benefits may be
more assured in certain instances than direct benefits.
93. For support of the motivational test, see Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S.
583 (1950); Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); United Grocers Ltd. v.
United States, 308 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1962).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1960).
95. Brown Shoe Inc. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950); Edwards v. Cuba R.R.. 268 U.S.
628 (1925).
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individuals or customers, on the other hand, have little hope of making
successful capital contributions after the holding in Teleservice.9' In
1975, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to further limit customer
contributions qualifying for section 118 treatment by issuing Revenue
Ruling 75-55797 and a later qualifying Revenue Ruling, 76-6l.9" In
Revenue Ruling 75-557 the Internal Revenue Service relied upon
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad99 and Hayutinlo° and held that
henceforth all customer contributions to regulated utilities represent-
ing connection fees for the construction or insulation of service lines
and water meters were includable in the gross income of the public
utilities. The revenue ruling overruled a policy that had been in effect
since the 1926 Liberty Light & Power Co.""' case and consequently over-
turned fifty years of tax accounting. The Internal Revenue Service,
which had ignored its gains in Teleservice, finally, after Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad and Hayutin, attempted to tighten the
definition of a capital contribution in the area of customer contribu-
tions. In effect, the ruling extended the Teleservire doctrine to regu-
lated public utilities, specifically a water company.
A congressional response was quick in forthcoming. Among the
myriad provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 was a little publicized
section amending section 118.102 Although the congressional reports
do not indicate the rationale behind the amendment to section 118, it
can be presumed that the utility companies were influential in its
promulgation.'0 3 Section 118(b), which modified section 118, provides
that customer contributions for water and sewer line construction are
nontaxable capital contributions to the recipient utility.1 4  Capital
96. Teleservice Co. v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919
(1958).
97. 1975-2 C.B. 33.
98. 1976-1 C.B. 12.
99. 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
100. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
101. 4 B.T.A. 155 (1926), acq. VI-I C.B. 4 (1927).
102. Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-455, § 2120, 90 Stat. 1525, 1912.
103. See N.Y. Times, July 20, 1976, at 15, col. 1.
104. H.R. 10612 as originally passed in the House contained no amendments to I.R.C.
§ 118. The first suggestion of amendment came with the Senate Finance Committee Report,
S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 435-36, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CoDE CONO. &
AD. NEws 3439, which was filed on June 10, 1976. The committee recommended that con-
tributions in aid of construction received by water and sewage disposal utilities "from an
existing or potential customer, a builder or developer, a governmental body, or any other person
should constitute a contribution to capital." To qualify for capital contribution treatment, the
committee recommended the following requirements: (1) the amouns received by the utilities
must be for qualified expenditures, "an amount which is expended for the acquisition or con-
struction of tangible capital assets, where the acquisition or construction of the facility was for
the purpose of motivating the contribution"; (2) the capital asset!; acquired must be used
predominantly (80%) in the trade or business of furnishing water or sewage services to the
utility customers; (3) the expenditures must occur by the end of the third taxable year, (4) any
amounts received but not directed towards the cost of the facility must either be returned to the
payer or claimed as income by the utility; (5) the amounts received are not to be included in
[Vol. 38:499
NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS
contributions are defined in section I 18(b)(1) to include money or
property received from any person by a regulated public utility pro-
viding water or sewage disposal services if the amount was a contribu-
tion in aid of construction and the amounts were not included in the
utilities' rate bses for rate-making purposes.
Section 118(b) also introduced the "expenditure rule," which re-
quires that amounts claimed as capital contributions qualify as such
only if the recipient utility expends an amount equal to the contribu-
tion for the construction or acquisition of section 1231(b) property
used in furnishing water or sewage disposal services. Moreover, the
expenditure by the utility must occur within two years of the receipt of
the contribution. Finally, the utility may not depreciate or claim an
investment credit for the contribution. The amendment to section 118
became effective February 1, 1976, which was also the effective date
of Revenue Ruling 75-577.
the utility's base rate for rate-making purposes; and (6) no depreciation or investment credit
will be allowed with respect to any property acquired as a result of a qualified expenditure.
The Finance Committee gave as an example of a qualifying contribution the situation in
which a customer pays a fee (connection fee) to reimburse the utility for lines that are turned
over to the water and sewage disposal utility.
The Senate passed H.R. 10612 with amendments on August 6, 1976.
The Conference Agreement to the Tax Bill, H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong.. 2d Sess.
223, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4205, adopted the Senate recom-
mendations with some modifications.- The two most important modifications made in the
Conference Agreement with respect to the section of the Finance Committee Report dealing
with capital contributions were: (1) § 1321 of the Conference Agreement explicitly excludes
from capital contribution treatment connection fees paid by customers (or potential customers)
of the utilities; and (2) § 1321 reduces by one year the time after receipt of the contribution
within which the utility is required to make the qualifying expenditure.
Both the Senate and the House adopted the Conference Agreement on September 16, 1976.
The capital contribution section (§ 2120) of the Tax Reform Act as signed by President Ford
on October 4, 1976, amended I.R.C. § 118 to read as follows:
SEC. 118. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAPITAL OF A CORPORATION
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include
any contribution to the capital of the taxpayer.
(b) CONtoRIBTsONs IN Am OF CONSTRUCTION.-
(1) GENERAL RULE.-For purposes of this section, the term "contribution to the
capital of the taxpayer" includes any amount of money or other property received from
any person (whether or not a shareholder) by a regulated public utility which provides
water or sewage disposal services if-
(A) such amount is a contribution in aid of construction,
(B) where the contribution is in property which is other than water or
sewage disposal facilities, such amount meets the requirements of the expenditure
rule of paragraph (2), and
(C) such amounts (or any property acquired or constructed with such amounts)
are not included in the taxpayer's rate base for rate-making purposes.
(2) EXPENDITURE RULE.-An amount meets the requirements of this paragraph
if-
(A) an amount equal to such amount is expended for the acquisition or
construction of tangible property described in section 1231 (b)-
(i) which was the purpose motivating the contribution, and
(ii) which is used predominantly in the trade or business of furnishing
water or sewage disposal services,
(B) the expenditure referred to in subparagraph (A) occurs before the
end of the second taxable year after the year in which such amount was received,
and
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Although the amendment to section 118 specifically directs the
Commissioner to issue regulations defining the term "contribution
in aid of construction," the Senate Finance Committee Report gave
several examples of what the phrase was intended to cover. The
Committee Report cited as qualifying examples situations in which a
builder or developer constructs water lines, water filtration plants, or
water towers and turns them over to a regulated public utility.
Similar treatment would be given to payments by builders or de-
velopers for such facilities. The report also listed payments by
governmental units to regulated public utilities for costs of relocating
water or sewer lines occasioned by street repairs as examples of
"contributions in aid of construction."10 5
The Conference Report of the Joint Senate House Committee
indicates that the amendment to section 118, although directed at
Revenue Ruling 75-557, did not entirely overruJe it. The revenue
ruling specifically dealt with the example of a new home purchaser
who was charged a connection fee to obtain water service. The
connection fee included a construction charge for furnishing and in-
stalling a service line and water meter to the water line running to the
customer's lot. The Conference Report is careful to distinguish items
that will not qualify under the amended section 118 and states that
customer connection fees are not qualifying expenditures. The report
defines customer connection fees as any amounts paid for the cost of
installing the connection between the customer's property and the
utility's main water or sewer lines.' 
6
(C) accurate records are kept of the amounts contributed and expenditures
made on the basis of the project for which the contribution was made and on the
basis of the year of contribution or expenditure.
(3) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(A) CONTRIBUTION IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION.-The term "contribution in
aid of construction" shall be defined by regulations prescrixcd by the Secretary;
except that such term shall not include amounts paid as customer connection fees
(including amounts paid to connect the customer's property to a main water or sewer
line and amounts paid as service charges for starting or stopping services).
(B) PREDOMINANTLY.-The term "predominantly" means 80 percent or
more.
(C) REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY.-The term "regulated public utility" has
the meaning given such term by section 7701(a) (33); except that such term shall
not include any such utility which is not required to provide water or sewerage
disposal services to members of the general public in its service area.
(4) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTIONS AND INVESTMEN1 CREDIT; ADJUSTLD
BASI.-Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, no deduction or credit shall
be allowed for, or by reason of, the expenditure which constitutes a contribution in aid
of construction to which this subsection applies. The adjusted basis of any property
acquired with contributions in aid of construction to which this subsection applies shnll
be zero.
105. S. REP. No. 94-938 Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Scss. 436, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE;
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3864.
106. H.R. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 223, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4205.
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The amendment to section 118, then, was not an attempt to over-
rule Revenue Ruling 75-557, but appeared to be a preemptive strike
to prevent more stringent limitations upon the use of section 118 by
regulated public utilities. The original Senate Committee Report 0 7
would have gone even further and directly overriden Revenue Ruling
75-557 because the report claimed the effect of the ruling would be to
substantially increase the taxes of utilities and ultimately result in
higher charges to customers. The Conference Report of the Joint
Senate House Committee, however, elected to sustain the ruling and
specifically stated that customer connection fees represented taxable
income to the regulated utility.
Although the revenue ruling is broad enough to be applied by
analogy to non-water and sewage situations, e.g., electrical services,
the amendment to section 118 is specifically limited to water and sewer
extension. The ruling does not mention electrical services, but specifi-
cally overrules cases in which the service provided was electricity. 08
The apparent reason for the amendment's restriction to water and
sewer extensions was fear of lost tax revenue if the amendment had
been extended to cover electric utilities. 0 9
The tandem effect of Revenue Ruling 75-557 and the amendment
to section 118 is to distinguish between contributions for the purpose
of connecting a customer to a regulated public utility water or sewer
line and contributions for extending the line of the utility to reach
the property of the customer. The former is taxable income; the latter
is a nontaxable contribution to capital.
The combination of the revenue ruling and the amendment to
section 118 is a sound treatment of a regulated public utility that
cannot utilize the contribution to capital in its rate-making base.
Presumably, a regulated public utility may charge a customer an
amount in aid of construction equal to the utility's actual cost of such
construction. The contribution by the customer will not increase the
utility's profits because the contribution will not be included in the rate-
setting base. The effect of the transaction is a mere transfer of title
to the assets. No financial or taxable gain or loss is enjoyed or suffered
by any of the parties to the transaction. It would be possible for the
customers of the utility either individually or collectively to pay the
builder or developer for the cost of the extension of water and sewer
lincs and then to maintain possession of them.
107. S. REp. No. 94-938 Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 434, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3862.
108. Rev. Rul. 75-557, 1975-2 C.B. 33.
109. According to a New York Times article, supra note 96, at 15. col. 4, the revenue
loss from water and sewer construction being labeled as nontaxable contributions to capital
was only S10 million. If telephone and electrical utilities had been included, the annual
revenue loss was estimated at S100 million.
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The lot owners could also have organized a joint venture and
pooled resources to build water and sewer lines to their properties.
Such a pooling of resources would not have resulted in taxable income
to any of the participants in the joint venture.110 Taxability should
not arise merely because the lot owners, rather than acting as an un-
incorporated association or partnership, choose to turn over to the
utility company the problem of the maintenance, title, and perhaps
construction of their water and sewer lines.
The amendment to section 118, therefore, is a rational classifica-
tion of the contribution of property or money to regulated public
utilities. Unlike the case of Teleservice such contribution is not pay-
ment for services. It is the pure analogy to the contribution by a
nonshareholder to the capital stock of a corporation. Thanks to the
regulated nature of the utility no abuse of such a system can arise.",
In a more sophisticated sense it can be argued that such con-
tributions are similar to those made by the corporate shareholder. In
reality every user of a utility's services is in effect a shareholder in that
utility. Through his capital contribution to the utility each customer
buys a "share" of construction cost of the utility and in turn receives
"dividends" in the form of water or sewer service. Recalling that the
joint stockholder venture was the forerunner of the corporation, one
can see that a regulated public utility is in effect -the heir to the his-
torical joint stockholder organization. The regulated public utility
also has a relationship to its customers that is very similar to the rela-
tionship between a publicly owned corporation and its shareholders.
Because the utility must serve all potential customers, it is nonex-
clusive, except for geographical considerations, just as a publicly
owned corporation is nonexclusive with respect to ownership of its
stock. The shareholders in a corporation contribute money or property
to the corporation in return for dividends or capital gains. A utility
customer receives benefits in the form of water or sewer services
rather than dividends or capital gains. Just as a shareholder can
divest or liquidate his investment by selling his stock, so can a utility
customer liquidate his investment by selling the property served by
the utility. Regulated public utilities are thus granted treatment
parallel to corporations. The amendment to section 118, therefore,
may be seen as limiting any possible overreach of Revenue Ruling
75-557.
110. See generally Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Non-Profit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
111. Because the utility is regulated it presumedly will not be allowed to charge more
for the water or sewer line connection than the extension cost to the utility. A private,
nonregulated cable television company is not barred from charging line extension fees that
include a profit. Moreover, the cable television company cannot be prevented from including
the value of contributed property in calculating the amount of profit necessary to produce a
desired rate of return.
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V. A TIME FOR REFORM
A. The Lack of a Federal Interest in the Subsidization of
Shopping Centers
Although dealing with customer contributions in the context of a
public utility, the 1976 amendment to section 118 failed to address
the expanded use of section 118 in the shopping center context. The
failure to overrule or circumscribe the holdings in Federated Depart-
ment Stores and May Department Stores was unfortunate. 12 The
congressional silence can only give encouragement to a wider use of
section 118. Since this use can lead to a loss of tax revenue,'13 the
federal interest in encouraging a shopping center developer to subsi-
dize a prime tenant must be examined.
The subsidization of a prime tenant by a shopping center developer
is an attempt to increase the desirability of a particular location in the
eyes of potential tenants and is accomplished in several ways. As-
suming that subsidization is made in the form of free land or free
building, the prime tenant's initial cost of locating in the shopping
center is lower. Thus, a prime tenant who has financial difficulty in
acquiring the capital necessary to purchase land or construct a build-
ing may only be able to locate in the center if the land or building is
provided free. Of course, most prime tenants do not "buy" land or a
building, they finance them. The question, therefore, is whether they
are financially stable enough or the proposed store is potentially
profitable enough to persuade someone to finance the land or the
building. The subsidization of the prime tenant enlarges the number
of prime tenants who can afford to locate in the shopping center.
As a result the developer either escapes complete unavailability of
prime tenants or increases the number of potential prime tenants.
Do either of these results benefit the federal government suffi-
ciently to warrant section 118 treatment? Because the only result of
the subsidization will be either to make the shopping center a viable
project or to increase the project's potential for survival, the answer
appears to be no. Additional shopping centers do not produce addi-
tional wealth. Presumably if there is X demand or X consumption,
that consumption or demand will be met by the existing retail outlets.
The addition of one or more shopping centers or the relative economic
success of any particular shopping center, as measured by the amount
of sales, can have only a marginal impact on the rate of consumption
because it is doubtful that additional shopping centers or more suc-
112. For a discussion of these cases see section I.F. supra.
113. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
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cessful shopping centers will increase the propensity to consume. It
is even more questionable whether shopping center subsidies are the
best way to increase consumption if that is desired. It is equally
probable that more shopping centers merely switch consumption pat-
terns from existing retail outlets to the new shopping centers. In this
manner, the availability of section 118 to developers may even be
counter-productive in relation to other professed federal governmental
objectives. For example, if it is the goal of the federal government to
revitalize the central city and if section 118 encourages the develop-
ment of shopping centers, which normally are not located in central
cities, section 118 contributes to the deterioriation of the central
city. 114
In addition to reducing the initial financing burden on prime
tenants, subsidization by the shopping center developer attracts po-
tential retailers by lowering the volume of sales necessary to achieve
profitability. A lower sales volume is necessary for three reasons.
First, the retailer does not have to earn the profit necessary to pay for
the building or land that he uses. Second, the retailer does not have
to earn a profit on the investment that he would otherwise have tied
up in the building or land. Third, the effect of the tax deferral
through the operation of sections 118 and 362(c) increases profits
without any corresponding increase in the risk of the project.
Does the federal government have any interest in providing these
advantages to certain retailers? It would appear not. The fact that
additional retailers are induced to participate in the project is not an
occurence of particular concern to the federal government for the
reasons listed above. The possibility of increased profitability to a
particular retailer, however, is more complicated because the retailer
may use the increased profitability in one of two ways. He will either
retain the additional profits for his own or his stockholder's benefits,
or he will utilize the increased profits to reduce the cost of goods or
to increase services to customers and thereby, in part, pass the ad-
vantage of the subsidy on to customers of the shopping center. The
choice whether to pass any of the savings on to the customer, how-
ever, depends solely upon the retailer's perception of which alternative
will earn the higher profit for him.
Whether the increased profits go to benefit a corporation or its
stockholders or whether the savings are passed on to the customers
in the form of lower prices or better services makes no difference to
the federal government. Section 118 was certainly not initially enacted
to provide a convenient way to aid certain retail groups or their cus-
114. Eg., Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Program. 42 U.S.c
§ 3331 (1970).
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tomers. n 5 Furthermore, the judicial expansion of section 118 to en-
compass the situations described in Federated Department Stores or
May Department Stores was not anticipated by Congress. The appli-
cation of the principle that certain transfers from nonstockholders to
a corporation should be classified as contributions to capital has come
a long way since Cuba Railroad.
B. Possible Congressional Action
Were it not for the court's holding in Federated Department
Stores, the logical solution would be to ban the use of section 118 in
shopping center situations. Such a limitation, however, would ap-
parently require congressional action because it is doubtful the In-
ternal Revenue Service could accomplish the change through a regu-
lation or revenue ruling. To do so the Service would have to use
its administrative authority to overrule or circumvent the courts.
Although there is nothing unlawful or ultra vires about the Service's
amending its regulations or rulings to place them at odds with court
holdings, it nevertheless appears highly unlikely that the Service would
do so. Having twice litigated the shopping center subsidization situa-
tion and twice lost, the Service is not likely to provide relief in the
form of new regulations or rulings, particularly in light of the Ser-
vice's failure to express a nonacquiesence in either Federated Depart-
ment Stores or May Department Stores.
Congress can and should pass appropriate legislation to preclude
an unlimited application of section 118. The solution lies in the ear-
lier attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to limit section 118 to
contributions by governmental units, civic associations, or the like.
Contributions by customers should continue to qualify, but only as
they meet the restrictions of section 118(b).
Were such legislation to be passed, the courts could confront the
task of identifying "governmental units," "civic associations" or other
similar groups. Identification of governmental units should not prove
to be difficult. Although the line between public and private agencies
is a shadowy one, much light has been thrown upon it as a result of
cases involving "state action" concepts under the fourteenth amend-
ment. ' 16  Identification of civic associations or the like should be
greatly aided by section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.117 Quali-
115. The legislative history does not indicate any such concern. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4648; H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CO.G. & AD. NEws 4025,
4042.
116. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
117. I.R.C. § 501(c).
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fying groups would be limited to organizations that meet section 501(c)
standards, particularly subsections 501(c)(4), (5), and (6).
Because tax revenue lost from the expansion of section 118 into
shopping center situations or similar "private contributions" is prob-
ably not great at this time congressional reform does not appear like-
ly. Reform did not occur in the 1976 Tax Reform Act, which specif-
ically addressed section 118, and it would be unreasonably sanguine
to anticipate further congressional action. If Congress fails to act,
however, the expansion and abuse of section 118 can be checked by
the courts. A judicial response is particularly appropriate because
section 118 is in a very real sense "judicial law." Sections 118 and
362(c) are, after all, congressional attempts to codify the common law
of contributions to capital that was originated by the Supreme Court
in Cuba Railroad and defined and developed by the courts for over
twenty years thereafter. Hence, it is in the nature of section 118 that
its application be tempered by judicial intervention if that is necessary
to avoid perversion of the section's original underlying purposes.
C. Possible Judicial Action
Judicial response could come in two ways. First, the courts
could overrule the Federated Department Stores principle and hold
that only governmental units, civic associations, or the like may be the
source of contributions to capital without affecting customer contribu-
tions sanctioned by section 118(b). In short, the courts could under-
take the action suggested for Congress. Were the courts to do so, one
could anticipate swift Internal Revenue Service acquiescence. The
Service might issue appropriate revenue rulings to clarify limitations
on the application of section 118. It is not likely, however, that the
courts will specifically limit contributions of capital (other than by
customers per section 118(b)) to contributions by governmental units or
civic associations. Having failed in its attempt to limit section 118 to
contributions by government or civic associations,"' the Internal Rev-
enue Service cannot reasonably expect to successfully litigate this issue
in the future.
As a second judicial response the courts could hold in the appro-
priate case that although section 118 is not solely limited to contribu-
tions by governmental units or civic associations, subsidization ac-
tivity will be granted section 118 treatment only when the contributor
is in fact a governmental unit or a civic association or is a group or
individual whose motivations for granting the subsidy parallel those of
a governmental unit or civic association. The taxpayer would have
the burden of establishing a motivation to benefit individuals, groups,
or institutions that a governmental unit or a civic association might
118. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 417 (61h Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 38:499
NONSHAREHOLDER CONTRIBUTIONS
reasonably have desired to benefit. In addition, the taxpayer would
have the burden of showing that the subsidy recipient would have
been the mechanism utilized to achieve the desired benefits.
If an individual or corporation transfers money or property un-
der circumstances that parallel those in which governments or civic
groups make transfers, to induce economic activity by the transferee
in the form of a locational choice or an enlargement of present fa-
cilities, there appears to be no reason not to grant section 118 treat-
ment to such a transfer. The problem is to distinguish that particular
sort of transaction from other transfers that an individual or corpora-
tion might make. Factually, the problem is not particularly difficult.
It should not be difficult for a court to determine whether the sort of
transfer being dealt with is comparable to the transfers that were held
to be capital contributions in the cases of Cuba Railroad, Brown Shoe,
and their progeny.
Only under circumstances in which the parties are able to show
that the transfer might reasonably have been expected to be made by
a government or civic group should section 118 status be confirmed.
Thus, in the case of Federated Department Stores or May Department
Stores the question would not have been whether the benefit to be
realized by the transferor was direct or indirect, or what the motivation
of the transferor was, but rather whether a government or civic group
could have been expected to subsidize a department store in the same
or similar manner.
Answering the question whether a governmental unit might have
been the origin of the questioned subsidy is not as difficult as it might
first appear. First, it should be recognized that the great majority
of governmental subsidization of private activity does not take place
in the form of outright grants of money or property to the recipient
corporation. In most cases governmental subsidization occurs in the
form of lowered taxes or the use of governmental borrowing authority
to allow the recipient to take advantage of lower interest rates. An-
other common subsidization device is construction of the requisite
facility by the government and rental to the recipient corporation at a
reduced rate or a rate reflecting the lower costs of construction in-
curred by the government because of its avoidance of local taxes and
lower interest rate on borrowings. Of course, local governments may
undertake more direct subsidization such as agreements to reim-
burse employers who maintain certain members or employees on the
payroll in the event that the profitability of the enterprise does not
meet certain prearranged standards. This type of subsidization is dis-
tinguishable from an outright grant of a fee interest in the building
or of the unqualified use of property or cash.
Distinguishing legitimate subsidization projects of a civic asso-
ciation is more difficult. A civic association by its nature will subsi-
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dize at those points where it is incapable of persuading the local
government to subsidize or because the form of the subsidy offered
by the local government is either unacceptable or insufficient for the
recipient corporation. Thus, one can expect a wider variety of subsidi-
zation forms-often more generous or more direct-by local civic as-
sociations. The line between what a civic association might do and
what a private developer might undertake can nevertheless be drawn.
Perhaps the underlying test is whether the economic activity to be
undertaken by the subsidy recipient can reasonably be expected to
produce benefits for the members of the civic association. The classic
cases of subsidization in this area occur when a civic association
subsidizes a major manufacturing firm's entrance into the area. The
resulting increase in employment and the general spur to the local
economy is a benefit to the members of the civic association. Cer-
tainly the influx of a major employer can be distinguished from a
new retailer who cannot produce additional production in the area.
At best the establishment of a new retailer results in the movement of
economic activity from a neighboring retailing center. It is possible
that the suburban civic association might subsidize a shopping center
in order to take over the economic retailing activity that takes place
in the central city or shopping centers in neighboring communities.
The burden should be upon the taxpayer to prove that subsidi-
zation might reasonably have been undertaken by some level of gov-
ernment or a local civic association. Such a requirement would be
in line with the normal burden of proof carried by the taxpayer. Any
corporation receiving a contribution to capital from anyone other thdn
a governmental unit or civic association would be taxed on such con-
tribution unless the recipient corporation overcame the presumption
of taxability. What elements, then, must the corporation prove in
order to rebut the presumption of taxability? Stated another way,
what should be the elements that distinguish nontaxable contributions
by governments or civic associations from taxable contributions by
private individuals, corporations, or other entities?
Historically, contributions to capital were motivated by a desire
to benefit two distinct groups. From the days of Liberty Light to the
present-as seen in the recent amendment to section 18-contributions
to capital have included situations in which a utility customer turned
the asset, or an amount equal to its cost, over to the utility rather
than retaining ownership of the utility line extension. The other cate-
gory of beneficiaries traces its origins from Cuba Railroad. In that case
and its progeny, many if not all of those benefiting did not directly
participate in the contribution. The contributor, whether a govern-
ment or a civic association, although interested in benefiting itself to
a greater or lesser degree, was nevertheless motivated or was at least
aware of the potential benefits accruing to its community residents.
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In other words, the contributor might have been primarily interested
in its own benefit, but was also motivated by the presence of direct
or indirect benefits, whether primary or spin-off, to other noncontrib-
utory elements.
The success of a new shopping center might bring significant
benefits to neighboring land owners in the form of rising land values.
Nearby businesses may profit handsomely from the opening of a
shopping center. Employment opportunities may be enhanced for lo-
cal residents. Increased tax revenues may benefit the local taxing
authority, as well as the local taxpayers. However, indirect or spin-
off benefits such as these are similar to those resulting from subsidi-
zation by a civic association. All the benefits listed above would, for
example, be present in the event that a civic association subsidized
the location of a new manufacturing plant. Nor can one distinguish
the civic association from the private contributor on the basis that
benefits are being enjoyed by the contributing party. The shopping
center developer seeks a quid pro quo when he subsidizes a tenant.
Similarly, the individual members who make up the civic association
are likely to anticipate individual economic benefits as a result of the
subsidization activities of the association. Consequently, examining
only the benefits arising from subsidization will not greatly aid the
courts in establishing a standard that will allow them to differentiate
between civic associations and nonqualifying shopping center develop-
ers.
The solution is to look not merely at the character of the recipient
of the benefits or at whether the benefits realized by the subsidizing
party are direct or indirect, but at the value of the totality of benefits
accruing to the subsidizing party. If the value of the benefits is rela-
tively equal to the cost of subsidy, the transfer should be classified
as income to the recipient corporation. It is unusual, but fair, that
the taxable consequences to the recipient corporation depend upon the
degree of benefit enjoyed by the transferor because the essential test,
as first enunciated in Cuba Railroad, is whether the transfer represents
payment for services. Today that test is still actively applied, but
the courts have mistakenly focused on whether the benefits are direct
or indirect.
The distinction between direct and indirect benefits is unsound.
The courts that applied that distinction should have been concentrat-
ing on whether "services" were being rendered. Had they done so,
the courts might have come to the realization that "services!' can be
"rendered" in ways far more esoteric than those imagined by the Su-
preme Court in Cuba Railroad. Services can be rendered by the sale
of the products of the transferor. They can also be "rendered" by a
recipient corporation even though it takes no active steps to aid or
benefit the transferor.
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The clearest example of rendering services occurs when there is an
actual exchange of services, for example, supplying cable television
programs in exchange for the line extension. 19 A less obvious exam-
ple of rendering services occurs when the subsidy recipient undertakes
activity that directly promotes both his own well-being and the well-
being of the transferor, for example, when a car dealer in exchange
for a cash subsidy agrees to relocate and sell the products of the
subsidizing party.1 20 The recipient renders the service, the sale of the
product, while equally, if not even more so, serving his own interests.
In the context of a shopping center development the recipient
may render valuable service to the transferor even though their rela-
tionship is landlord and tenant, or seller and purchaser of land. The
anchor store in the shopping center renders an ascertainable and valu-
able service to the shopping center developer even though the store
does nothing but pursue its own economic interest. The shopping
center developer who grants free land or a free building to an anchor
store is "buying" the economic advantage to be gained as much as if
he had purchased the right to receive cable television by agreeing to
subsidize the cost of the extension of the cable line. If the transferor
can reasonably expect to receive economic benefits roughly equal to
the cost of the subsidy, the transfer represents payment for those
benefits, or "rendered services." The recipient corporation has there-
by "sold" something of value even if the benefit sold is a noncontrol-
lable, nondirectable, spin-off from its economic activity. The fact that
the locational decision of a retail store has become a commodity that
can be "sold" to a shopping center developer represents a new, albeit
unusual and unexpected, source of income to the recipient store. Were
the courts to perceive these so-called contributions to capital by indi-
viduals or entities other than governments or civic associations as the
disguised purchases that they are, the courts would have little hesi-
tancy in supporting the Internal Revenue Service in its efforts to tax
the transfers.
VI. CONCLUSION
As has often been said, that which can be done will be done.
With the propensity of taxpayers to avoid taxes whenever possible, if
a standard or attempt to restrict the limits of section 118 is not forth-
coming, it seems only a matter of time until more and more taxpay-
ers become cognizant of the potential advantage inherent in the lib-
eral application of section 118. Such expansion of section 118 is not
by itself a major problem when compared with the other revenue
119. Teleservice Co. v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919
(1958).
120. John B. White, In. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 729 (1971), afl'd 458 F.2d 989 (3d Cir
1972).
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losses inherent in the Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears to be a particularly unnecessary one. If Congress cannot be
made to take an active role to limit the possible expansion of section
118, it is up to the courts and the Internal Revenue Service to formu-
late standards that will carry out the intent of Congress under sec-
tion 118, denying its protective cover from situations never contem-
plated by the Congress and not warranting the advantages of sec-
tion 118.

